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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pacific Bay Baking Company ("Pacific Bay") respectfully 
submits its reply brief on appeal. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. G&K Services has Briefed the Wrong Appeal. 
In its opening brief, Pacific Bay argued that attorney's 
fees should be allocated on a claim by claim basis. Thus, 
Pacific Bay is entitled to fees attributable to its successful 
defense of G&K Service's claim for liquidated damages, regardless 
of whether G&K is entitled to fees attributable to the stipulated 
judgment in this matter. 
Rather than the one at bar, G&K has briefed a case in which 
only one claim is at issue and thus where there can be only one 
party entitled to fees.1 By changing the facts (from a multiple 
to single claim case) as well as the issue on appeal, G&K is thus 
able to cite authority for the proposition that a plaintiff who 
obtains some but not all of the relief sought is normally 
entitled to fees.2 
G&K spends it entire brief attacking what Pacific Bay 
clearly labeled an alternative argument: if the Court disagrees 
that fees should be allocated claim by claim, Pacific Bay was 
nonetheless the prevailing party under the circumstances. 
Opening Brief, pp. 14, 24. Cf. Response Brief, pp. 27, 34. 
2
 See First Southwestern Financial Services v. Sessions, 875 
P.2d 553 (Utah 1994) (single claim for deficiency action); 
Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981) 
(affirmative judgment rule on single claim); Underwriters at 
Lloyd's of London v. North American Van Lines, 829 P.2d 978 (Okl. 
1992) (defendant succeeded in lowering damages paid, but did not 
defeat claim entirely). But see Smith v. Jenkins, 873 P.2d 1044 
(Okla. 1994) (rejecting net judgment rule in comparative 
negligence action). 
1 
Pacific Bay does not quibble with G&K's rule as applied to 
most single claim cases. Opening Brief, p. 21. This is not a 
single claim case. 
B. G&K's Misunderstanding of the Issues on Appeal 
Permeates its Argument on the Standard of Review. 
While it correctly notes that Pacific Bay "does not 
challenge the language of the contract," G&K incorrectly 
concludes that the abuse of discretion standard must therefore 
apply. The language is what it is. The issue is not what the 
words are, but how they are affected by the facts and law. 
While G&K makes the inevitable claim in a footnote that the 
trial court erred in finding that G&K breached the contract, it 
did not feel strongly enough about this issue to cross-appeal. 
The facts are thus undisputed, leaving this Court with an issue 
of law: did the trial court err in denying Pacific Bay fees 
attributable to its success on a discrete claim at trial? 
G&K's argument for an "abuse of discretion" standard ducks 
the question. The issue of "discretion" comes up when the amount 
of fees are at issue. Opening Brief, p. 5 n. 1. This is not 
such a case, except to the extent the trial court failed to make 
adequate findings in support of its fee award to G&K.3 
Concerning the standard of review, the only case which G&K 
cites and Pacific Bay did not is Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1993). Baldwin did not involve a contract, but instead 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1), which permits the court to award 
fees in the event a claim or defense is 1) meritless and 2) was 
asserted in bad faith. The Baldwin court first addressed whether 
fees were appropriate under the statute, and then turned to what 
it termed the "discretion" issue: the amount of the award. Id. 
at 1199. See also Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, P.2d , 240 
Utah Adv. Rpt. 17, 21 (Utah App. 1994) (mechanics lien statute 
obligated court to award fees to defendant who successfully 
(continued...) 
2 
The question at bar is one of law. Review is de novo. 
C. Pacific Bay is Entitled to Fees for its Success at 
Trial Regardless of whether it Counterclaimed. 
G&K argues that only defendants who prevail on counterclaims 
are entitled to fees. Instead, Utah law permits a party who 
successfully defends against a claim to "recover the fees 
attributable to those claims on which the party was successful." 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr. 791 P.2d 217, 221 
(Utah App. 1990). See also Stacev Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 
1080 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied. 779 P.2d 688 (1989) 
(defendant was entitled to fees for claims on which it was 
successful, including not only counterclaims but successful 
defense of attempt to accelerate promissory note). Cf. Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990 n. 9 (Utah 1988) ("Trial 
courts are accustomed to apportioning attorney fees between 
multiple parties and attributing fees to separate causes of 
action."); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. supra. n. 3, P.2d 
, 240 Utah Adv. Rpt. 17, 20-21 (Utah App. 1994) (trial court 
erred under mechanics lien statute in not awarding defendants 
fees attributable to successful motion for summary judgment 
dismissing mechanic's lien action). 
3(...continued) 
sought summary judgment dismissing a mechanics lien action, while 
bond statute allowed court discretion). 
For its discretion standard, Baldwin cites Dixie State Bank 
v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), in turn citing Turtle 
Management v. Haggis Management. 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). Both 
of these cases centered on the amount of fees awarded. Dixie 
State Bank. 764 P.2d at 989 and n. 6; Turtle Management. 645 P.2d 
at 671. 
3 
G&K distinguishes this authority only by artifice. G&K 
gives Occidental/Nebraska barely a nod, Response Brief, p. 19, 
and incorrectly claims that the defendant in Stacev Properties 
received fees only because it won on a few counterclaims. 
Response Brief, p. 33. 
Similarly, G&K dismisses Marassi v. Lau, 859 P.2d 605 (Wash. 
App. 1993), recon. denied. 1993 Wash. App. Lexis 390 (1993) in a 
footnote, arguing that Marassi dealt with (and implicitly, only 
with) fees for a successful counterclaim. Response Brief, p. 28, 
n. 8. Marassi is instead directed squarely to the issue at bar, 
and teaches that the net judgment rule fails when "a defendant 
has not made a counterclaim for affirmative relief, but merely 
defends against the plaintiff's claims." 859 P.2d at 607.4 
While it at least cites Occidental. Stacev, and Marassi 
(although it inaccurately recounts the latter two), G&K is simply 
mum on the Florida cases which Pacific Bay discussed in its 
opening brief. See Folta v. Bolton. 493 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1986); 
Consolidated Southern Security, Inc. v. Geniac & Assocs., Inc.. 
619 So.2d 1027 (Fla. App. 1993); Park Lane Condominium Ass'n v. 
DePadua, 558 So.2d 85 (Fla. App. 1990). These cases are fully 
consistent with Utah law: attorney's fees should be awarded on a 
claim by claim basis, regardless of whether the defendant 
Thus, "when the alleged contract breaches at issue consist 
of several distinct and severable claims, a proportionality 
approach is more appropriate." Id. at 608. 
Marassi carefully noted that its plaintiff raised multiple 
and distinct breaches of contract, not one breach with several 
alternative damage theories. Id. The same is true here. 
4 
prevails on a counterclaim or instead simply defeats one of the 
plaintiff's claims.5 
This law is also good policy. Under G&K's "counterclaim" 
rule, a defendant who resists counterclaiming and then defeats 
all but one insignificant claim in a multi-claim case is entitled 
to no fees, while the plaintiff remains entitled to fees (at 
least to the extent she succeeded). This result penalizes the 
nonlitigious defendant, while at the same time letting a 
plaintiff whose claims were all groundless, save one, escape 
without compensating the defendant for its time. 
The claim-by-claim analysis also recognizes that under the 
rules of joinder, what otherwise would be distinct lawsuits under 
a contract (such as the case here) may be tried together as 
separate claims in one action. Liberal joinder serves the 
salutary purposes of judicial economy. However, a defendant's 
right to fees for defeating what otherwise would be a wholly 
separate suit should not be curtailed simply because the 
plaintiff has chosen to bring her claims all at once. See Folta 
v. Bolton, 493 So. 2d at 443 (discussing plaintiffs' tactics in 
joining nonmeritorious claims with meritorious claims in order to 
jockey for fees). Cf. Elder v. Triax Co., 740 P.2d 1320, 1322 
(Utah 1987) (defendant could not use unresolved status of 
5
 G&K cites In re Marriage of Watters, 782 P.2d 1220 (Colo. 
App. 1989), a single claim suit, for the notion that a party only 
has to win on a "significant" issue, and receive some of the 
benefit sought in the litigation, in order to prevail. Response 
Brief, p. 30. The instant case is not about issues; it is about 
wholly distinct claims which would have been separate lawsuits 
absent rules governing joinder. Regardless of what is done in 
Colorado, Utah law divides cases by claims. 
5 
permissive counterclaim to thwart plaintiff's right to fees under 
separate claim on which plaintiff had already prevailed);6 Turtle 
Management v. Haggis Management, supra, n. 3, 645 P.2d 667, 671 
(Utah 1982) (although plaintiff had used Rule 18 to join all 
possible claims against all defendants, plaintiff was only 
entitled to fees from the lone defendant against whom it 
prevailed; plaintiff could not seek a "free ride" for its fees at 
the expense of the successful defendants).7 
D. G&K's Offer of Judgment Argument Bears, at Most, Only 
on the Issue of Whether Pacific Bay was Recruired to Pay 
G&K's Fees, not on whether G&K Should Pay Pacific Bay's 
Fees. 
G&K apparently urges either: 1) that Pacific Bay could have 
cut off liability for fees to G&K by making an offer of judgment; 
2) that an offer of judgment would have entitled Pacific Bay to 
fees; or 3) both. 
If G&K means to argue point one, it has again misunderstood 
this appeal. This case is not about Pacific Bay's liability for 
The Triax dissent (unsuccessfully) argued that the net 
judgment rule ought to control the fee issue, and that the rule 
could not be applied until all counterclaims were resolved. 74 0 
P.2d at 1323-24. The dissent noted, again to no avail, that the 
parties' contract gave the prevailing party dn the "suit" the 
right to fees, and argued that "suit" included counterclaims. 
Id., 740 P.2d at 1324. 
The fee clause in the case at bar requires the "unsuccessful 
party" in a "legal proceeding" to pay the fees of the successful 
party. G&K was the unsuccessful party on its wholly discrete 
claim for liquidated damages. 
7
 Florida statutory law requires the courts in multiple-party 
cases to apportion fees among prevailing parties "in accordance 
with the principles of equity." Folta v. Bolton. 493 So. 2d at 
443. The Folta court found that multiple party actions (such as 
the kind at issue in Turtle Management) are sufficiently 
analogous to multiple claim actions to warrant application of the 
same rule to the latter. Id. 
6 
G&K's fees properly attributable to the open account claim. It 
is about G&K's liability for fees to Pacific Bay on the 
liquidated damages claim. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 68, governing offers of judgment, is itself 
directed to discrete "claimts]," not lawsuits.8 First 
Southwestern Financial Services v. Sessions. supra, n. 1, 875 
P.2d 553 (Utah 1994), a case decided after Pacific Bay filed its 
opening brief, was a single claim case. This one is not. Thus, 
First Southwestern's teaching (that a defendant can cut off its 
obligation to pay fees on a claim by offering judgment) does not 
apply. By crossing lines between the two claims at issue, G&K 
misapplies the rule, as did the trial court.9 
G&K further errs if it believes that Pacific Bay could have 
saved its right to fees on the liquidated damages claim only by 
offering judgment on the open account claim. Rule 68 requires 
the claims to be treated separately. Moreover, the offer of 
judgment rule does not apply in the case of a total defense 
victory on a claim. See 7 J. Moore, J. Lucas & K. Sinclair, Jr., 
Mooref s Federal Practice % 68.06[2] (2d ed. 1994) (discussing 
8
 See also Kehoe v. Keister, 727 F. Supp. 896, 899-90 (D. N.J. 
1989) (discussing Rule 68 in context of multiple claim case). 
Cf. Shores v. Sklar. 885 F.2d 760, 762-63 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1045, 110 S. Ct. 843, 107 L.Ed.2d 838 (1990) 
(because defendant successfully offered judgment for entire 
putative class action, not simply on his individual claims, 
defendant lost right to appeal district court's denial of class 
certification). 
9
 First Southwestern could easily have disavowed Occidental 
Nebraska or Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992), 
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993), but did not. The court 
further emphasized that it believed its hand was forced by Utah's 
deficiency statute. 23 9 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7-8. 
7 
Delta Air Lines. Inc. v. August. 450 U.S. 346, 101 S. Ct. 1146, 
67 L.Ed.2d 287 (1981)). Pacific Bay did not believe that G&K was 
entitled to any liquidated damages. Pacific Bay was not 
obligated to make a meaningless offer of zero on that claim in 
order to preserve its right to fees attributable to its success 
on the claim. 
G&K also deems Pacific Bay a deadbeat who would not even pay 
what it agreed that it owed. This needless claim is belied by 
G&K's own citation to the record, which shows that Pacific Bay 
had agreed in settlement discussions that it owed G&K a sum 
certain. Response Brief, p. 21. However, Pacific Bay refused to 
pay G&K any liquidated damages. Once in the courtroom and able 
to put on its defense against liquidated damages, Pacific Bay 
stipulated to judgment in the agreed amount so that only the 
disputed issue would be tried. 
G&K's related complaint about the time and expense it spent 
on the stipulated issues is more window dressing. Pacific Bay 
has paid G&K for its time. Pacific Bay's complaint is that much 
of G&K's fees were not attributable to a success.10 
G&K also carps at length about Pacific Bay's "failure to 
show" at the first trial in this matter, apparently in the belief 
that this has something to do with the issue on appeal. As 
explained in its successful moving papers to set aside the 
default, Pacific Bay did not appear because it did not receive 
notice of the trial. Record, pp. 29-30. Once it received a copy 
of the proposed default judgment, Pacific Bay quickly retained 
counsel, had the default set aside, and went on aggressively to 
defend this case. 
G&K did not suffer by virtue of the default being set aside, 
since the trial court ordered Pacific Bay to pay G&K's fees for 
trial preparation (including, presumably, preparation for its 
failed liquidated damages claim) and even the fees for G&K's 
(continued...) 
8 
E. G&K Embraces the Fallacy of the Constructive Award. 
G&K urges that if Pacific Bay is entitled to "recognition" 
for G&K's failure at trial, it has been compensated "almost 
twice" what it is due by virtue of the trial court's cut in G&K's 
fees. Response Brief, p. 36. We have discussed in Pacific Bay's 
opening brief why this argument is so wrongheaded. 
G&K was not entitled under any circumstances to be paid for 
its failure at trial. The trial court did not compensate Pacific 
Bay at all for its success at trial. This was error. 
F. The Trial Court made only Assumptions, not Findings, 
Concerning the Amount of Fees Awarded to G&K. 
The record does in G&K's argument that the trial court made 
adequate findings concerning the amount of G&K's fees. 
G&K's lead counsel proffered testimony that he spent 8.5 
hours before trial in this matter. Record, p. 317, Ins. 24-25; 
p. 318, Ins. 1-6. Counsel took an additional 2.5 hours in 
drafting and serving the complaint. Record, p. 317, Ins. 19-20. 
Counsel's associate spent six hours researching Pacific 
Bay's course of performance defense on the liquidated damages 
claim (on which Pacific Bay was completely successful), two hours 
of trial preparation time, and time at trial. Record, p. 318, 
Ins. 12-19. 
Adding in the plaintiff's trial time spent following the 
proffer, and estimating the amount of additional time the 
plaintiff would spend on drafting findings and conclusions, the 
10(. . .continued) 
unsuccessful opposition to setting aside the default. Record, p. 
50. 
9 
trial court arrived at a total fee of $2,080, which it then 
reduced to $1,450.00, in purported recognition of Pacific Bay's 
success at trial. Record, p. 403, Ins. 21-25; p. 404, Ins. 12. 
Under Utah law, the $1,450.00 which the trial court awarded 
must be attributable in toto to whatever success G&K obtained at 
trial. The trial court made no such finding or computation. 
Moreover, the record proves that the bulk of G&K's time was 
directed to the claim upon which G&K failed. The time devoted to 
this claim encompassed almost the entire trial, as well six hours 
of research directed to the course of performance issue, and 
presumably a commensurate amount of actual witness preparation 
time on the issue. 
When G&K defaulted Pacific Bay early in this case, G&K's 
lead counsel submitted an affidavit of attorney's fees testifying 
that he had spent 2.5 hours in preparation for trial and for 
attending trial long enough to proffer evidence and identify 
witnesses. Record, p. 57, 1 3 (affidavit); p. 16-17 (Findings 
and Conclusions setting forth G&K's proffer). Yet at the real 
trial, counsel claimed fees for 21.5 hours of his time and his 
associate's, almost a tenfold increase. This increase can of 
course be explained: the case went to trial the second time 
around. However, G&K lost the contested claim at trial. 
Although apparently prepared to handle the trial alone when 
G&K defaulted Pacific Bay, G&K's lead counsel felt compelled to 
involve an associate at the actual trial once Pacific Bay 
submitted a trial brief. Record, p. 318, Ins. 7-19. This trial 
brief, however, went solely to the claim upon which Pacific Bay 
10 
prevailed. Record, p. 66. Since lone counsel took only 2.5 
hours to 1) prepare for the entire first trial (including, 
presumably, preparation for the liquidated damages claim), and 2) 
proffer evidence, it is unlikely that any more time than this was 
required to prepare the second time around on the open account 
claim, the only claim on which G&K saw success. 
In footnote 12 of its brief, G&K offers some after the fact 
arithmetic showing how the trial court might have arrived at its 
award. The trial court, not litigants, are required to make 
findings. The record shows that only a de minimis amount of 
G&K's time can be fairly charged to a success. The court's award 
tracks neither the evidence nor law. 
The remainder of G&K's argument on the findings question 
confuses the main issue on appeal (the correctness of awarding 
fees on a claim by claim basis) with the distinct issue of what 
fees G&K was entitled to. Nowhere does G&K point to the findings 
which Utah law demands. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's fee award should be reversed, with 
instructions for the court to award each party those fees (and 
only those fees) attributable to the claim on which the party 
succeeded. 
DATED this / CT day of August, 1994 
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae 
I
Mark Wv Dykes 
Counsel, for^  Pacific Bay 
Baking Company 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Defendant/Appellant Pacific Bay Baking Company was served this 
12th day of August, 1994, by depositing same in the United States 
mails, first class, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Theodore E. Kane11 
Daniel L. Steele 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
12 
